<Chapter 1> Evolution of environmental governance in the East Asian Region: A historical perspective  (Part I: Environmental governance for sustainable development in the East Asian region) by Mori, Akihisa
Title
<Chapter 1> Evolution of environmental governance in the
East Asian Region: A historical perspective  (Part I:
Environmental governance for sustainable development in the
East Asian region)
Author(s)Mori, Akihisa




© United Nations University, 2013; This pdf is an accepted
manuscript of the following chapter: Evolution of
environmental governance in the East Asian region: A
historical perspective. 'Environmental Governance for
Sustainable development: An East Asian Perspective', pp.19-






- 1 - 
Chapter 1 Evolution of Environmental Governance in the East and Southeast 
Asian Region: A Historical Perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
Many developing nations in East and Southeast Asia, such as South Korea, China, Vietnam, 
Thailand and Indonesia were dominated by authoritarian regimes after independence. Civil society 
has long been repressed and has had limited impact on controlling pollution and advancing 
sustainable development, though the extent varies considerably among nations. International 
society also has exerted little influence due to the customary international law principle of 
sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference. Experience of losing control over natural 
resources before the World War II made many East and Southeast Asian nations take a hostile 
attitude toward intervention to internal affairs. 
Several East and Southeast Asian nations have transited to democratic regime since the late 
1980s. South Korea and Taiwan moved to democratic regime in the late 1980s, Thailand in the 
early 1990s (1), and Indonesia in the late 1990s. 
Rapid integration into the globalizing market and the resulting changes of economic and social 
systems has intensified environmental degradation with increasingly transnational implications, 
making it difficult for the state to address the problem on its own. Hence, the state is required to 
allow a variety of actors to join in and to orchestrate them to participate in environmental 
governance is a proper manner. 
This chapter picks up major drivers to examine how they have exerted influence on East and 
Southeast Asian developing nations and other actors to increase their role in environmental 
governance. 
 
2. Initial Driving Force: International Environmental Aid 
The 1972 United Nations Conference on Human and Environment and the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) affected many East Asian nations in 
creating major environmental laws and regulations and establishing within the central government 
an administrative organ in charge of environmental issues. At the outset, they capitalized their 
authoritarian regime on establishing centralized, hierarchical, and closed administrative institutions, 
and to employ command-and-control policy instruments. They established government 
organizations in charge of the environment, “borrowed” environmental regulations and standards 
from industrialized nations to implement in their jurisdictions, and increased resources and 
delegated authority for environmental protection. International donors assisted them in creating 
such institutions, and implementing environmental impact assessments (EIAs), increasingly 
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imposed as a funding requirement (Yap, 1994). Canada, for instance, attempted to transfer 
knowledge and skills in EIA to Thailand and Indonesia (Eedy and Hurlen, 1994). 
During 1996-2005, major international donors provided US$116 billion as environmental aid, 
which the Development Assistance Committee under the Organization of Economic Co-operation 
and Development OECD-DAC defined as Official Development Assistance (ODA) that had the 
environment as its primary purpose or that had the environment as an important secondary purpose. 
East and Southeast Asia received a share of 38% from these funds (Figure 1-1). Japan had provided 
more than three quarters to this region (Figure 1-2). In line with its aid principle of “self-help,” 
Japan allocated environmental aid in providing subsidized loans for investments in monitoring, 
pollution abatement technologies and infrastructure that were readily available for solving serious 
environmental pollution. Japan’s bulk of environmental aid pushed Chinese government to 
implement environmental projects that had been prepared in the Ninth Five Year Environmental 
Protection Plan and the Trans-century Green Project Program. It also demonstrated the 
effectiveness of technological solutions to political elites of China (Mori, 2008). Since then, 
Chinese government has increased environmental investments, adopted stringent environmental 
regulations and enhanced local implementation (Mori, 2008). Furthermore, China has utilized the 
Canadian support to the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and 
Development (CCICED) as a vehicle to gain intellectual capital including proposals for solving 
environmental issues that were of high priority to China (Imura, 2004). Moreover, it has learned 
experiences of environmental policies of Europe and Japan, adjusted them in the domestic context 
to implement. Feed-in tariff for renewable energy, Euro IV standard for regulations on automobile 
exhaust emissions and policies promoting "circular economy" can be referred to as such policies 
(Mori, 2011). 
However, international donors have often faced several barriers to inducing policy changes 
(Keohane, 1996). First, donors often have higher concern for the environment while recipients 
show higher interests in economic growth. Even if recipients do show environmental concern, they 
often place higher priority on domestic environmental degradation than on transnational or global 
environmental problems for which donors have higher concern. Second, both donors and recipients 
seek to maximize their own benefits while shift costs to others. Donors seek to exert influence to 
policy change in recipients with least cost, while recipients seek to obtain maximum financial 
capital from donors while attempt to avoid policy change that may weaken political support. Unless 
both parties have at least some confidence in the other’s commitment, no agreement will be reached. 
Even when agreements are reached, they have incentive to behave strategically. Finally, recipients 
do not always have sufficient techniques, analytical tools, incentives or organizational structure to 
decide and manage the aid effectively. Faced with these constraints, international donors gained 
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little, if any success in convincing East Asian nations to have stringent and effective environmental 
policies and implementation, even if they showed good performance at project level (see Ross, 
1996). Recipients’ lack of stringent policy and effective enforcement has discouraged international 
donors to continue environmental aid.  
In addition, the authoritarian approach that East Asian nations had taken often caused the serious 
implementation deficits at the street level: policies made centrally are rarely sensitive to the local 
circumstances in which local governments operate; and the structure of administration prevents 
learning from being communicated up the administrative hierarchy (Dryzek, 2005: 95-96). East 
Asian nations, however, did not take them seriously as they placed higher priority on economic 
growth and did not show strong willingness to enforce nor provide enough legal authority and 
resources to the organizations in charge. 
To overcome these barriers, together with avoid criticism over adverse environmental impacts of 
the assistance, the World Bank stopped financing of logging operations in old-growth forests and 
construction of dams and began to replace these by forest and water sector adjustment loans to 
promote environmental reform (Ross, 1996). The Bank recognizes the root cause of the 
environmental problems as the undervaluation of the environment and social institutions that 
regulate the use of environments and allow their use on a non-profit basis. With this logic, the Bank 
provided forest sector loans or emergency loans on the condition that recipients should reform 
forest policy to include private ownership of environmental resources, transformation of 
community-managed uncapitalized lands into transnationally regulated zones for commercial 
logging, pharmaceutical bio-prospecting, export-oriented cash cropping as well as megafauna 
preservation and eco-tourism  (Goldman, 2005). It also assisted water sector reform consisting of 
privatization of public utilities, full cost recovery and reduction of subsidies. 
Nonetheless, the effectiveness and sustainability of this intervention is under question. The 
Bank-imposed forest policies have seriously impacted the environment and society due to a lack of 
enforcement, unclear boundaries of conversion or degraded forest areas, non-transparent 
concession operations, and a lack of community participation in implementation and control of the 
resources. In Indonesia, for example, this resulted in acceleration of oil palm plantation (World 
Bank, 2000). The Bank-imposed water sector reform allowed multilateral private water companies 
to join in the recipient water sector, but they frequently violated the agreements, raised water tariffs, 
managed resources improperly and charged excessive connection fees and tariffs. This resulted in 
an increasing number of people who cannot get access to clean water, as typically appeared in 
Johannesburg and Manila (Flynn and Chirwa, 2005; Kluge and Scheele, 2008). Thus recipients 
increasingly reversed the bank-imposed policy package and/or refuse it once they recovered from 
balance of payment crisis (2). 
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In response, international donors take more indirect intervention that emphasizes community 
empowerment on the one hand, and emphasize policy learning and inter-linkage between policy 
and environmental technology on the other hand (Mori, 2011). The World Bank initiated several 
“innovative” environmental programs, including the eco-watch program that disclosed the rating of 
firms’ emission discharge, referring to the Toxic Release Inventory in the United States. It assumed 
that disclosure would empower stakeholders such as communities, investors, workers, and the 
public to exert pressure for better monitoring, and thus incentivize pollution reduction in areas 
where government regulation was weak (World Bank, 2000a). At the same time, the Bank replaced 
massive afforestation projects that had often disregarded local livelihood by community-based 
environmental conservation projects. Bilateral donors have also emphasized the community-based 
approach and allocated financial capital to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are 
assumed to have comparative advantage in collaboration with local community and 
community-based environmental programs. 
Germany and Denmark attempted to diffuse “innovative” environmental policy instruments and 
programs as a way of policy learning. Influenced at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in 2002, South Korea and Taiwan seriously implemented sustainable development 
strategies under the Democratic Party governments. China and Thailand adopted feed-in tariff and 
invited Danish and German firms to join in their market to increase the supply of renewable energy 
(Mori, 2011). 
 
3. Domestic Pressure for Environmental Protection 
Upsurge of the middle class resulting from industrialization, coupled with the end of the Cold 
War led to uncovering of people's frustration against concentrated power and political repression, 
and vitalized democratic movements. This, in turn, induced a widespread debate on not only the 
political freedom and institutional democracy, but also the empowerment of civil society and public 
participation in the political systems. Environmental protests that had been suppressed under 
authoritarian political regimes also frequently broke out. 
Democratic institutions and environmental movements have placed pressure on the state to 
develop institutions for the environment. In Japan, democratic institutions allowed victims of 
environmental hazards and the media to raise their voice and to exert influence on voting, 
monitoring courts ensure unbiased judgment, and pressuring local governments for an effective and 
persuasive enforcement of environmental legislations, all of which brought a rapid reduction of 
industrial pollution (Mori, 2012b). South Korea implemented various types of participation 
mechanisms at national and local governments, ranging from advisory committees for 
environmental policy-making, public-private forums, reward systems for monitoring and reporting 
- 5 - 
of environmental violations as a way of enhancing environmental policy and conflict management 
(Jeong and Seo, 2012). Taiwan saw a court ruling that admitted procedural flaws in decision of the 
EIA Review Board, which led to the suspension of a large industrial development project. It also 
admitted public involvement in divergent forms, including representation in decision-making 
bodies, participation in public hearings, demonstrations, sit-ins, and litigations during the two 
decades of burgeoning democratization (Yeh, 2012). Thailand’s democratic movement in the 1990s 
and the resultant 1997 Constitution supported protests against government-sponsored development 
projects, and opened a political window for networking among community groups (UNDP 
Thailand, 2003). Rising environmental awareness of the people, coupled with easier access to 
information through internet has also encouraged their empowerment. Even in China where 
democratic movement had been completely crushed in 1989, the number of protests against 
industrial pollution and forced land exploitations by local governments has increased recently. The 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) implicitly allowed central media to uncover 
the environmental conflicts to place pressure on local governments in charge. With the assistance 
from the World Bank, the SEPA implemented an eco-watch program that enables local 
governments to obtain, process, and disclose firms’ state of emission to mobilize community to 
place pressure to industrial pollution, which came up with the Environmental Information 
Disclosure Act 2007. 
However, democratization has not automatically created better institutions for the environment. 
There were several constraints on the part of the government namely, 
 
- lack of sufficient political will to undertake environment-friendly policy development 
- weak coordination between various ministries and agencies dealing with environmental 
governance 
- the absence of a comprehensive national environmental policy that could be translated into 
effective enforcement measures 
- lack of funding 
- inherent vagueness of standards, partly due to the fact that “borrowed” standards were 
inappropriate for local circumstances 
- insufficient enforcement authority of the environmental institutions (Adeel and Nakamoto, 
2003: 222-223). 
 
In addition, most of the nations have not adequately ensured pluralistic, participatory 
environmental decision-making, access to information, and justice in a transition from authoritarian 
to democratic government (Mori, 2012a). This shortcoming, coupled with a growth-oriented 
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strategy, has allowed states to initiate development projects that disregarded their environmental 
implications. In Japan, local governments, major driving forces for stringent environmental 
regulations and effective enforcement in the 1970s, turned their attitudes in the 1980s to cooperate 
with the central government to obtain subsidy for attracting industrial plants and tourism industry 
(Mori, 2012b). This accelerated development projects and environmental degradation accordingly. 
It was not until the Japanese government faced a severe fiscal deficit and fierce local protests that it 
seriously started to take environmental benefits and costs into account in appraising development 
projects. 
In Taiwan, people distrust courts and the law due to the lack of a sound legal system of 
environmental liability and the notorious history of the courts under the authoritarian 
regime—where courts were more like a tool of suppression than a way to realize justice (Yeh, 
2012). As a result, various protests and environmental movements preferred out of court political 
deals. In Thailand, industries and business took over the power from military governments in the 
democratization process, and the most democratic constitution in its history was enacted in 1997 
and valid until 2006, when the Thaksin administration was toppled in a military coup. Nonetheless, 
the state has promoted environmental conservation as far as it is in conformity with their interests. 
Industrial afforestation is promoted, as a means of watershed and flood protection and seeking 
profits, while local communities relying on forests for their livelihood have not acquired the right to 
protect forest (Mori, 2003). Environmental impact assessment procedure has often been ignored or 
implemented only after projects had already started. 
Recent globalization, coupled with liberalization and privatization has increased competitive 
pressures of capital accumulation while shrinking the political autonomy, legitimacy and function 
of the state. This has significant implications to domestic environmental governance. On the one 
hand, it has accelerated exploitation of environment and natural resources. In Indonesia, 
democratization and local autonomy delegated regencies (kabupaten) and municipalities (kota) 
authority to issue permission on development and share revenue from resource exploitation. This 
institutional rearrangement, coupled with the World Bank forest sector loan that required removal 
of entry barriers for foreign companies, has motivated resource-rich local governments to 
excessively issue logging concessions and permissions for forest conversion for palm oil 
plantations, and has helped development projects that would negatively impact the natural 
environment and local society. Yet the central government has no more authority to prevent such 
negative impacts. Complex and lengthy procedure and limited standing of an environmental case 
constrain the role of court ruling (Mori, 2004). 
Globalization has also had significant impacts the transition economies of China and Vietnam. 
Increased amount of FDI became an engine of economic growth while a source of environmental 
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degradation at the same time. The accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) accelerates 
decline in the share of state enterprises, modernization of industrial plants and change in the 
industrial structure, which reduces environmental pollutions and opened the door for states to a 
wide range of new market-based policy approaches. 
 
4. Regional Integration and Environmental Governance 
Increasing international division of labor and the movement toward market integration in the 
East Asian region can have both positive and negative impacts on the environment. On the one 
hand, market pressure may trigger regulatory competition, leading to a “race to the bottom” in 
terms of social and environmental standards to attract firms. On the other hand, the quest for 
international competitiveness may push efficient use of resources and reduced emission of exhaust 
gases and waste from firms. Firms may urge the state to implement more stringent regulation to 
take advantage in the international market. States are increasingly adopting more stringent 
standards of their richer and green trading partners, and even compete to implement innovative 
environmental policy domestically and put it forward to higher level of governance to gain a first 
mover advantage (Vogel, 1997). 
Referring to the EU experience, there are several preconditions for market integration to work as 
a driving force of upward harmonization of environmental policies. First, the region has a shared 
understanding of environmental protection. The EU described provisions on environmental 
protection in the EU Constitutions in 1997 to share the precautionary principle, with pressures from 
then newly accessed Northern European nations that had already implemented more stringent 
environmental policies (Mori, 2012c). This led to the directives and regulations based on this 
principle, as well as to the initiatives toward environmental policy integration. 
Second, there should be a high level of political commitment to market integration, which 
enables a nation to delegate part of their national sovereignty to regional decisions. Negotiation will 
fail when a nation requires too many provisions on special treatments, and/or if it pursues a drop of 
competitiveness of the rivals in the region in the process. 
Third, market integration provides economic gains to participant nations large enough to cover 
the increased cost of, for example, compliance with environmental regulations. Central and East 
European (CEE) states accepted the Acquis to access to the EU, hoping that they could gain larger 
economic gains. The EU has extensively used the Cohesion Fund to financially support CEE states 
to comply with all the requirements in the Acquis, including environmental requirements, which 
rendered to avoid weakening environmental regime as well (Homeyer, 2005). 
The Asian economic crisis triggered a cognitive change by reinforcing the perceived impact of 
the regional environmental disaster and the sense of vulnerability of many Southeast Asian nations. 
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Many nations became less tolerant of regional environmental impacts. This induced a number of 
initiatives and frameworks, including the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution 
and the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) (chapter 12 in this volume). 
However, there are too many regional environmental initiatives and frameworks that are 
overlapping and ineffective in implementation. Nations that suffered from damages have competed 
to propose regional environmental initiatives and frameworks to protect themselves from damages, 
with little consideration to reciprocal benefits. They failed to reach a common understanding and 
share environmental norms to solve the problem. 
In addition, there is no serious political commitment to regional market integration except 
among ASEAN. Although the Asian economic crisis motivated East Asian nations to employ 
regional approaches as a way of crisis management, China, together with the United States fiercely 
opposed Japan’s proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), bringing a much weaker 
institution of the Chiang Mai Initiative that arranged multilateral currency swap among ASEAN, 
China, Japan and South Korea. Instead, each nation has sought for trade agreements for its own 
benefit, without regard to negative economic implications to their rivals. This is especially true of 
South Korea that actively initiated free trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN, EU and the Unites 
States. Unlike the North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA) and EU-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreements, it has rarely incorporated environmental provisions into the agreement. 
China has been responsive to regional FTA after accession to the World Trade Organization while 
seeking for stronger ties with Europe as an export market and with the Middle East and Africa to 
secure energy and other resources. On contrast, South Korea, China and Japan have only made a 
snail progress toward the tripartite free trade agreement despite potentially large economic and 
environmental gains from increased production and resource efficiency (chapter 10 in the volume). 
All of these factors led to the collapse of the regional environmental regime and failure of the 
upward harmonization of environmental policy in the region. 
 
5. Domestic Responses to the Global Climate Regime 
International governance institutions had been ineffective in environmental protection, because 
of East Asian states’ priority on industrial development, their strong perception against unduly 
imposition of a “Western” ethic, and adverse impacts of compliance on their economy (Adeel and 
Nakamoto, 2003). This was the case in international climate change negotiations and the 
formulation of climate change policy, due to insufficient capacity and skeptical attitude toward 
climate change. With the exception of Japan, East Asian nations have no obligation to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
Nonetheless, the global climate regime has changed the environmental norm, interest, and cost 
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and benefit profile in the East Asian nations. After the Marrakech Accord had described the 
modality, procedures and guidelines for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), East Asian 
nations have gradually sought opportunities to gain windfall financial benefits and to obtain 
advanced environmental technologies from industrialized nations. These benefits encouraged many 
East Asian nations to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. As time passed, the number of UN-approved CDM 
projects to gain CERs has dramatically increased in major East Asian nations during the period of 
2007-2011 (Table 1-1). The Chinese government has gained considerable windfall revenue by 
imposing higher levy to the HFC-23 reduction and N2O decomposition projects, both of which 
generate larger CERs with cheaper costs. Although the forest sector has received the least CDM 
projects, prevention of land use change is likely to bring financial capital under the Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries. The United 
Nations has set up a pilot REDD Program to provide funds to those partner countries whose 
national programs are approved, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines and Cambodia. 
One of the outstanding feature of the climate regime is that CDM and REDD is changing cost 
and benefit profile at local level. Under the existing regional and global environmental regime, the 
cost of environmental protection is often imposed on local communities with little compensation, 
which causes severe conflict and nullifies the effectiveness of the regime. CDM and REDD, by 
their mandate of contributing to sustainable development, allows local actors to improve their 
livelihood. An approval of unilateral CDM projects at the UN, in which host nations develop 
carbon reduction projects with local technology to find out foreign partners that merely purchase 
CERs, enabled local actors to reflect local needs and to gain from projects, enhancing the sense of 
ownership. Methane recovery from livestock, for example, can provide multiple gains to farmers, 
ranging from reduction of chemical fertilizer and fossil fuel consumption, improvement of inner air 
quality and water quality nearby, to additional revenue from CERs. 
This change in cost and benefit profile at local level, in turn, makes it easier for a state to make a 
firm commitment to environmental regime. Increased sense of ownership and economic gains 
enables East and Southeast Asian states to save cost of monitoring and enforcement, reducing the 
risk of non-compliance with the international commitment. The interaction between GHG emission 
and acid rain and/or haze and forest fire convinced the Indonesian government to create a national 
climate change action plan in 2007, which set out targets for reduction of forest fire hot spots by 
75% in 2012 and by 95% in 2025. 
The upsurge of the debate over the post-2012 framework has brought the global environmental 
norm to East Asian nations. While the international climate regime failed to conclude binding 
agreement on GHG emissions reduction after 2012, many East Asian nations submitted the 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) that shows GHG emissions reduction targets 
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by 2020 to the United Nations. Despite its voluntary nature, East Asian nations have implemented a 
variety of policies to attain this target, taking future international negotiations into account. They 
initiated fiscal stimulus in the name of green new deal, provided subsidy for consumers to purchase 
energy-efficient electric appliances and automobiles, and increased government spending for 
high-speed trains and renewable energies. South Korea, China and Taiwan implemented a 
feed-in-tariff for renewable energy, though South Korea turned it into a renewable portfolio system 
in 2012. Indonesia cut its fuel subsidy in 2004 and 2008 as a means of both reducing fiscal deficit 
and carbon emission. These serious actions may lead to East Asian regional policy such as an 
emission trading scheme, an East Asian counterpart of EU-ETS, as a way of efficient reduction of 
GHG emissions. 
Their cognitive changes in part have intensified linkage between climate actions and nuclear 
power at the same time, generating controversy. The governments of South Korea, China and 
Taiwan, and Japan have accelerated the process of installing new plants to reduce carbon emissions 
from fossil fuel-fired power plants, and to satisfy the increasing demand for energy at the same 
time. The Fukushima nuclear accident dramatically reduced the credibility of nuclear safety claims 
and rendered it difficult for Japan to operate the existing nuclear plants, let alone to find suitable 
locations for new ones. This prompted the Japanese government to implement a feed-in-tariff 
system for renewable energy, time-of-day power pricing and carbon-energy taxation, while 
compromising its commitment to the GHG emissions reduction by 25% by 2020. China, which 
shelved its plans for new nuclear power plants after the Fukushima accident, has recently started 
new projects. 
 
6. Hybrid System in Environmental Governance 
Faced with decreasing influence of international environment aid and shortfall of regional and 
global environmental regimes to provide effective environmental governance, an expectation rises 
that there are circumstances under which private sector can become a part of the solution. To the 
extent that the Porter Hypothesis holds true, private firms that take an early action to stringent 
environmental regulation will gain financial profit and enhance their international competitiveness 
in the global market at least in the short run. In addition, the global convergence of standards and 
regulations will widen the market of technologies (Jacob et al, 2005). Leading companies may have 
ample incentives to work with the government to diffuse their “innovative” standards and 
regulations worldwide to explore the market for their technologies and products. Export-oriented 
firms and transnational corporations abide by more stringent standards and regulations in the export 
markets to increase export. Product-oriented regulations, such as the EU Regulation on Hazardous 
Substances (ROHS) and the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals 
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(REACH) have shown to impact the supply chain of the products, thus forcing all the firms along 
the supply chain of a product to change materials and processes even in East Asia. 
States have an incentive to emulate or refer to other nations’ successful policies when faced with 
uncertain policy alternatives in order to legitimize it and bring about a preferred outcome. Given 
the information gap between states and firms, states rely increasingly on knowledge of the private 
sector, including transnational corporations, in determining standards and regulations. However, 
states adopt policies and measures only when they are consistent with the domestic political, 
economical and social contexts (Tews, 2003). They tend to avoid adopting actions that may bring 
significant distributional impacts, as exemplified by the snail-paced progress of renewable energy 
diffusion policy in Japan and the wastewater fee in Thailand. 
Civil society and environmental NGOs can serve as transnational channels of communication 
through which information on policies in other political constituencies can be communicated. They 
have expanded their transnational network to collaborate with their counterparts in developing 
nations, to provide intellectual capital and to support their empowerment. Many East Asian states 
have long suppressed NGOs and their activities on the grounds that these may deter state 
development projects, cause social unrest and ultimately spur anti-government movements. 
However, democratization has opened new spaces for creating such transnational channels of 
communication. Even China, where an authoritarian regime still dominates, the state allows 
transnational networking of civil society and environmental NGOs as long as it can serve to 
complement intellectual capital and enforcement of the national and local governments. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
We can map out the findings of this chapter on the evolution of environmental governance in the 
East Asian region depicted in Figure 1-3a, 1-3b, and 1-3c. By the late 1980s when authoritarian 
states sought development to legitimize their regime, and kept the principle of sovereignty, 
non-intervention and non-interference, international environmental conferences and foreign aid 
were the only way of influencing norms and interests of political elites. Democratization, and 
environmental protests that followed by prompted political and economic elites to recognize that 
the state should have environmental institutions (Figure 1-3a). 
In the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s, political and economic elites perceived the sense 
of vulnerability in economic and ecological terms, and sought for regional cooperation as a form of 
crisis management. Severe ecological damages made them perceive the importance of 
environmental norms, but they intensified export-oriented growth strategy as a way of overcoming 
economic vulnerability. Regional environmental initiatives and frameworks did not always address 
the underlying causes of the problem, while they made China and Indonesia perceive the huge 
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amount of compliance costs that accrued to a large number of heterogeneous emitters. Coupled 
with overlapping roles and ineffectiveness, and historical mutual distrust among neighboring 
nations, these initiatives and frameworks failed to bring effective outcomes (Figure 1-3b). 
Climate regime has helped overcome this logic of state sovereignty partly because it is perceived 
as a global environmental norm that accepted common but differentiated responsibility, and partly 
because new financial mechanisms have changed the cost structure both at national and local level. 
This has made it easier to approach the underlying causes of the problem. Private sector actors and 
civil society increasingly command a significant place as both transnational channels of 
communication and driving forces of more stringent and effective environmental policy. While the 
practices of state-over-society remains to a varied extent, the hybrid environmental governance 
system has become more prominent in East Asia as depicted in Figure 1-3c. 
The jury is still out on the question whether the evolution of environmental governance can 
change the course and mode of economic development in the East Asian region. The following 
chapters will go in more detail to see how each constituent of multi-level environmental 
governance in the East Asian region has rendered the change. 
 
Note 
1. Thailand is unique in that it experienced the first election in 1933 while has been mostly 
governed by military-dominated regimes by 1994. 
2. Uprisings against water privatization in 2000 forced contracts with private company terminated 
in Cochabamba and La Paz/El Alto in Bolivia. Consumer groups’ pressures pushed Jakarta 
government to refuse raising water tariff, which led to the exit of Themes Water and Suez from the 
private water supply in Jakarta, Indonesia.  
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Figure 1-1 Commitment Amount of Environmental ODA by Region, 1995-2005 
Source: Calculated based on OECD-DAC (2008). 
 
Figure 1-2 Commitment Amount of Environmental ODA to East and Southeast Asia by Donor, 
1995-2005  
Unit: US$ billion 
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Table 1-1 CDM projects by Host Country, as of August 2007 and August 2011 











China 104 426,844,851 1,677 1,276,789,502
India 267 187,131,906 785 303,439,082
Brazil 104 107,087,357 228 155,120,391
Mexico 89 39,955,799 142 60,014,194
Malaysia 16 11,463,346 108 29,450,220
Indonesia 9 10,773,936 74 29,020,424
Vietnam 2 6,814,760 74 14,122,586
South Korea 14 86,408,037 67 107,781,322
Philippines 10 1,938,201 58 8,550,644
Thailand 3 3,972,525 57 14,176,566
Chile 19 19,451,374 55 32,111,780
Colombia 6 2,925,827 34 16,336,478
Argentine 10 26,308,586 25 36,806,341
South Africa 10 12,332,795 20 16,656,766
Nigeria 1 10,525,546 5 20,315,925
Others 93 70,422,035 293 2,437,133,524
Total 757 1,024,356,881 3,702 4,557,825,744
As of August 13, 2007 As of August 1, 2011
Host country
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Figure 1-3a and 1-3b Environmental Governance in East and Southeast Asian Nations by the 
mid-1990s and by the early 2000s 
Source: author. 
 
Figure 1-3c Environmental Governance in East and Southeast Asian Nations after the 
mid-2000s 
Source: author. 
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